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Is the Presumption of Corporate 
Impunity Dead? 
Keynote Address by 
Ambassador David Scheffer 
at Corporations on Trial: International Criminal and Civil 
Liability for Corporations for Human Rights Violations 
The Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Conference 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
September 15, 2017 
Subsequent to the delivery of this address of September 15, 
2017, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Jesner v. 
Arab Bank on April 24, 2018.1 In a 5 to 4 vote, Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority of Justices Roberts, Alito, 
Thomas, Gorusch, and himself, held that corporations are not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).2  
Justice Sotomayer, writing for the minority of Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and herself, argued that corporations 
can be held liable under the ATS.3 The author aligns himself 
with the views expressed by Justice Sotomayer in the dissenting 
opinion. 
 
. David Scheffer is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law 
and Director of the Center for International Human Rights at 
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.  He was the first U.S. 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001).  Portions of 
this keynote address were incorporated in a Just Security blog by 
Ambassador Scheffer entitled, “The Rome Treaty Has Nothing to Do 
with Jesner v. Arab Bank” (October 10, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/45791/rome-treaty-jesner-v-arab-bank/.   
1. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 2018 WL 1914663 (Apr. 24, 2018). 
2. Id.  
3. Id. at 1 (Sotomayer, S., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U. S. C. §1350, categorically forecloses 
foreign corporate liability. In so doing, it absolves corporations from 
responsibility under the ATS for conscience-shocking behavior. I 
disagree both with the Court’s conclusion and its analytic approach. 
The text, history, and purpose of the ATS, as well as the long and 
consistent history of corporate liability in tort, confirm that tort claims 
for law-of-nations violations may be brought against corporations under 
the ATS. Nothing about the corporate form in itself raises foreign-policy 
concerns that require the Court, as a matter of common-law discretion, 
to immunize all foreign corporations from liability under the ATS, 
regardless of the specific law-of-nations violations alleged. I respectfully 
dissent”). 
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The dialogue at this conference focuses on three broad areas 
relating to corporate liability for human rights violations: 
accountability, transparency, and morality. I will bore into 
accountability, while recognizing up front that impunity for corporate 
behavior in the realm of human rights is being challenged with 
legislative and stakeholder initiatives in reporting transparency and 
development of guidelines, and by expressions of morality at the CEO 
level. I point to just one example of guidelines, namely “The 
Corporate Crimes Principles,” issued in October 2016 by the 
International Corporate Accountability Roundtable in Washington 
and by Amnesty International.4 It is an extremely useful set of ten 
principles to guide those who aim to hold corporations accountable. 
My colleagues in the profession, James G. Stewart and Alex Whiting, 
served as experts in the preparation of the principles. 
But the force of morality can be stronger than anything we 
legislate, anything we uphold in the courts of law globally, and 
anything we mandate for reports and other instruments of 
transparency, including an aggressive mainstream media and Fifth 
Estate. None of us are naïve enough to think that corporate impunity 
is somehow gasping its last breath, far from it. But the tide is 
turning. The pathway to corporate responsibility, which is being built 
in bold defiance of impunity, is not a straight line and it does not and 
should not traverse only courtrooms. The issue of overcoming 
corporate impunity for human rights violations and how we frame our 
analysis of it is, and must be, multidimensional. Professor Caroline 
Kaeb, who joins us at this conference, is pioneering innovative ways 
to achieve corporate responsibility with non-litigious methodologies.5 
But I speak here today of two developments in the field of 
accountability. 
 
4. The Corporate Crimes Principles, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE, Oct. 6, 2016 [https://perma.cc/4BET-
YVU2]. 
5. See generally Caroline Kaeb, A New Penalty Structure for Corporate 
Involvement in Atrocity Crimes, 57 HARV. INT. L. J. (Online 
Symposium) (2016) also available at http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/ 
07/a-new-penalty-structure-for-corporate-involvement-in-atrocity-crimes-
about-prosecutors-and-monitors/ (noting the use of corporate monitors 
to ensure corporate compliance); and Caroline Kaeb, Law, Morality, and 
Rational Choice, in Corporate Social Responsibility?: Human Rights in 
the New Global Economy 193-206, (Charlotte Walker-Said & John 
Kelly, eds.) (University of Chicago Press, 2015) (applying behavior 
economics to compliance); and Harlan Loeb, Principles-Based 
Regulation and Compliance: A Framework for Sustainable Integrity, 
Huffington Post: The Blog (May 5, 2015 5:24 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/harlan-loeb/principlesbased-
regulaton_b_7204110.html [https://perma.cc/M4W9-9MCQ] (working 
with Caroline Kaeb to advocate for a principle-based culture in 
corporations). 
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I begin with the notable case of Jesner v. Arab Bank, which will 
be argued before the Supreme Court on October 11, 2017.6 Full 
disclosure: I filed an amicus brief on behalf of the petitioners in the 
case.7 While the case concerns civil rather than criminal liability, the 
fate of corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute,8 and how such 
liability is framed by egregious human rights violations, hangs in the 
balance, unless the Supreme Court simply invokes the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law in favor of Arab Bank. 
I doubt that particular outcome because the Supreme Court 
presumably granted certiorari only for the purpose of addressing the 
issue of corporate liability; repeating the Kiobel II9 exercise of raising 
the issue of corporate liability only to bury it under the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law would be an odd 
undertaking and outcome for the Supreme Court. There is a clear 
circuit split on the issue of corporate liability, reaffirmed by the 2nd 
Circuit in Jesner, so the battle lines are drawn and the time has 
arrived. The Alien Tort Statute either covers, as violators of the law 
of nations or U.S. treaties, corporations as well as natural persons or 
it only covers natural persons. The relatively recent split in the 
circuits must be repaired.   
In my amicus brief I examine two issues that the Supreme Court 
justices should take note of during their deliberations. First, the 
Second Circuit and the respondent continue to rely on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter the “Rome 
Treaty”)10 and the negotiations leading to its conclusion to deny 
liability for corporations. Take it from someone who was there 
throughout the U.N. talks: There is simply no basis in the history of 
the negotiations leading to the Rome Treaty that prohibits civil 
liability of corporations for commission of or complicity in the 
commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, the 
most egregious types of human rights violations. Our relatively brief 
discussions about the status of criminal liability of corporations for 
commission of or complicity in atrocity crimes led to a dead end, but 
 
6. See generally Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, THE SUPREME COURT, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfil
es/html/public/16-499.html [https://perma.cc/AD83-EA4X] (noting the 
disposition of the case thus as of Nov. 1, 2017). 
7. Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University 
Pritzker School of Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, 
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499. 
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). 
9. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 
July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (entered into force July 1, 
2002).  
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that only speaks to the issue of criminal liability. We were not 
discussing civil liability, which is the only form of liability under the 
Alien Tort Statute, but has no application whatsoever, even for 
natural persons, under the Rome Treaty. 
Let me  bore into this a bit because this issue remains central at 
least to the issue of civil liability for corporations under the Alien 
Tort Statute, and if that is eviscerated by the Supreme Court, thus 
immunizing corporations, then I suggest that criminal liability will be 
much harder to establish in the years ahead. We may need to 
strengthen the foundation for civil liability first before building new 
frameworks for criminal liability. 
The Second Circuit and the respondent assume—incorrectly—that 
the Rome Treaty, which exclusively and deliberately focused on the 
establishment of a criminal court, purposely reflected a widely 
accepted international consensus against all criminal and civil liability 
of corporations for crimes against the law of nations, as if corporations 
essentially are immunized from any legal liability in their operations. 
That incorrect assumption is flatly refuted by the history of the Rome 
negotiations and the structure of the Rome Treaty itself, both of 
which expressly and solely address criminal liability. The Second 
Circuit also wrongly assumes that this purported international 
consensus continues to be accepted widely in customary international 
law. Even disregarding the fundamental error of its predicate 
assumption, the notion that there is a continuing consensus against 
civil liability is contradicted by the broad acceptance among legal 
systems that public law can provide remedies for corporate 
misconduct. Indeed, in addition to the widespread acceptance of civil 
liability, there is an increasing acceptance of criminal liability in the 
almost two decades since the Rome Treaty was completed. 
The Second Circuit and respondent hold a position that, in its 
final analysis, would entitle corporations to commit or be accomplices 
in atrocity crimes wherever they operate in the world unless there is a 
national law on the territory where they operate that outlaws specific 
crimes by juridical persons. Luckily, provided the Supreme Court so 
rules, in the United States there is the Alien Tort Statute that at 
least imposes civil liability on such corporate conduct against aliens, 
including when it occurs on foreign territory and, under the Kiobel II 
test, touches and concerns the United States.   
So, it is true, but irrelevant to the issue before the Supreme 
Court, that there was divergence among States and legal systems at 
the time of the Rome Treaty’s negotiation regarding the applicability 
of criminal statutes to juridical persons that cannot be subjected to 
the traditional criminal penalty of deprivation of liberty. Exclusion of 
corporations from International Criminal Court prosecution was 
inevitable, not because States agreed that corporations are above the 
law as a matter of right or of principle, but because a fundamental 
underpinning of the Rome Treaty is the preference for and deference 
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to domestic prosecution (the principle of complementarity) and the 
obligation of State Parties to undertake the capacity to prosecute. If a 
legal system did not hold juridical persons liable under criminal law, 
then under the Rome Treaty that national system  would likely fail 
the test of complementarity.   
By the way, the U.S. delegation at Rome, which I headed, was 
fully aware of the fact that corporations are subject to criminal 
sanctions in the United States. Including juridical persons in the 
Rome Statute would have been an easy “give” for the United States if 
we only had our own jurisdiction to consider. But, given the diversity 
of treatment of corporate criminal liability globally, it was not 
possible to negotiate a new standard of corporate criminal liability 
with universal application in the time frame permitted for concluding 
the Rome Treaty. Equally, it was not plausible to foresee 
implementation of the complementarity principle of the Rome Treaty 
in light of such differences in criminal liability for juridical persons 
among so many national jurisdictions. Nor was it possible, in so few 
days at Rome, to consider the complex revisions to the long-evolving 
text of the treaty that would be required to extend the personal 
jurisdiction to corporations.   
The omission in the Rome Treaty of provisions for civil 
proceedings against juridical persons is utterly insignificant. To the 
contrary, the negotiations in Rome leading to the creation of the 
International Criminal Court understandably steered clear of civil 
liability for tort actions—by multinational corporations as well as by 
natural persons—because civil liability fell outside of the self-
described criminal tribunal. No conclusion can be drawn, either from 
the negotiations leading to the Rome Treaty or from the absence of 
corporate criminal or civil liability in the Rome Treaty, that 
undermines a general principle of law regarding corporate civil 
liability or that prevents national courts from holding corporations 
liable in civil damages for torts committed on national or foreign 
territory. 
Nor have legal systems frozen in time. Article 10 of the Rome 
Treaty expressly accepts that international law may evolve for 
purposes other than the treaty.11 Since 1998, corporate criminal 
liability has been growing rapidly across the globe.12 A significant 
number of nations that have ratified the Rome Treaty, indeed 29 
countries that I list in my amicus brief, also enacted national 
implementing legislation that establishes corporate criminal liability 
for atrocity crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Rome Treaty, 
 
11. Id. at Art. 10 (“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or 
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law 
for purposes other than this Statute”). 
12. Scheffer, supra note 7, at 6. 
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or have adopted comparable laws for the same or other serious crimes. 
These States certainly did not act as if the Rome Treaty precluded 
expanding corporate liability into the realm of atrocity crimes. Indeed, 
one might speculate that the Rome Treaty, by focusing ratifying 
States’ attention on atrocity crimes, provided an impetus to accord 
greater accountability within their domestic legal systems. 
These developments point to the evolving codification of 
corporate criminal liability at the national level that aligns with the 
long-standing general principle of law of corporate civil liability for 
torts that is found in almost all jurisdictions, including the United 
States and, with respect to Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Alien Tort 
Statute. At the international level, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
an international criminal tribunal, found in 2014 in a contempt case 
that corporate criminal liability has become a general principle of 
law.13 The respondent scoffs at this ruling, as if the deliberations of a 
far-off tribunal are somehow meaningless. I think we know better.    
The United Nations International Law Commission is crafting a 
Convention on Crimes Against Humanity14 that includes corporate 
criminal liability. The commentary on the inclusion of corporate 
liability in the draft convention states that the ILC “decided to 
include a provision on liability of legal persons for crimes against 
humanity, given the potential involvement of legal persons in acts 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. In doing so, it has focused on language 
that has been widely accepted by States in the context of other crimes 
and that contains considerable flexibility for States in the 
implementation of their obligation.”15 The commentary also provides a 
rich source of authorities demonstrating the presence of corporate 
criminal liability in multilateral treaties.16 Thus while the Rome 
Treaty has been a major impetus in the trend towards corporate 
criminal liability in national legal systems, so too have the many 
 
13. See Press Release, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Panel Decides 
on Jurisdiction in Case STL-14-05 (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/media/press-releases/3514-judicial-panel-decides-on-
jurisdiction-in-case-stl-14-05 [https://perma.cc/T5W9-5P6H] (stating 
that legal persons, which includes legal entities, can be criminally liable 
under Lebanese law). 
14. See Summaries of the Work of the International Law Commission: 
Crimes Against Humanity, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (Aug. 9, 
2017), http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_7.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/VK3B-VJ7G] (showing the Commission’s progress of 
work concerning crimes against humanity). 
15. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/71/10, at 264 (2016). 
16. See id. at 263-64 (providing treaties that address corporate criminal 
liability). 
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recent multilateral treaties confirming corporate criminal liability for 
terrorism, bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions, protection of the environment, transnational organized 
crime, corruption, the unauthorized trans-boundary movement of 
hazardous wastes, and, perhaps, someday crimes against humanity. 
But let us return to the fundamental premise of the Alien Tort 
Statute: it is a law that concerns civil liability. While grave criminal 
conduct can certainly constitute violations of the law of nations, that 
fact does not translate into having to establish that corporations are 
subject to criminal liability as a matter of international law in order 
to be held responsible for criminal acts, falling within the extreme 
degree of torts no doubt, under a national statute of civil liability; it 
simply means that the criminality of certain actions, such as atrocity 
crimes, in which corporations engage, either directly or as 
accomplices, can certainly be subject to civil liability under a national 
statute, such as the Alien Tort Statute. Imposing additional criminal 
liability on corporations, which has been standard fare in the United 
States for certain corporate conduct for more than a century, can be 
pursued under other laws and with further legislation. To suggest, 
however, that the Alien Tort Statute can only hold corporations 
civilly liable if they are subject to criminal liability as a principle of 
international law is, frankly, nonsense. The general principle of law, as 
a major source of international law—that  corporations are subject to 
civil liability for torts—remains  as strong today as it has in the past. 
The bottom line is this: Corporate impunity for violations of the 
law of nations or U.S. treaties should not be read into the Alien Tort 
Statute based upon a misinterpretation of the Rome Treaty or an 
unfamiliarity with the global evolution of both domestic and 
international law. 
The second issue I want to address is corporate liability under the 
Rome Treaty. As it now stands, only corporate officers or employees 
responsible for their company’s criminal conduct that falls within the 
International Criminal Court’s subject matter, territorial, and 
temporal jurisdictions are subject to investigation. I include 
“employees” because one must bear in mind that under the 
Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (15 
September 2016), the Prosecutor leaves open the option of bringing 
charges not only “against those persons who appear to be the most 
responsible for the identified crimes.”17 She will “first focus on the 
crime base in order to identify the organisations (including their 
structures) and individuals allegedly responsible for the commission of 
 
17. Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation, at 14 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N66G-SLDS]. 
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the crimes.”18  The reference to “organisations” can include a 
corporate entity; nothing prohibits the Prosecutor from looking at the 
corporation and how it has engaged in atrocity crimes before focusing 
on natural persons within the corporation. Do not be surprised to see 
corporate officials called as witnesses, avoiding culpability but 
shedding light on how the corporation committed atrocity crimes or 
was complicit in their commission and thus how the charged 
individual fits within the corporate juggernaut and steered it towards 
criminal conduct. The prosecution of a corporate President, CEO, 
CFO, or Chairman of the Board of Directors will be a de facto 
prosecution of the corporation. At least that is a very real possibility 
before the International Criminal Court.   
I should note that there has been one corporate executive, Joshua 
Arap Sang, the former head of operations and well-known radio 
personality of Kass FM in Nairobi, Kenya, who faced prosecution at 
the International Criminal Court as an indirect co-perpetrator of 
three counts of crimes against humanity. He was charged with using 
coded messages in his radio broadcasts to commit murder, forcible 
transfer, and persecution.  This all related to the post-election 
violence of 2007-2008. But the Trial Chamber vacated the charges 
against him on April 5, 2016.19 The shadow power of witness 
interference and political meddling likely intimidated critical 
witnesses. The charges against Joshua Arap Sang broke the mold at 
the International Criminal Court and essentially put Kass FM—
through the person of one of its corporate executives—on the road to 
a criminal trial. 
The Prosecutor, in her policy paper, goes on to state that her 
investigation and prosecution of those most responsible “may entail 
the need to consider the investigation and prosecution of a limited 
number of mid- and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately 
build the evidentiary foundations for case(s) against those most 
responsible.”20 These types of individuals abound in the corporate 
world; just ask the investigators immersed in the investigation of 
VW21 and other diesel-engine automobiles today. Is it a crime against 
humanity by corporate officials to knowingly, willingly, fraudulently, 
and illegally cause the emission into the atmosphere of toxic chemicals 
that attack civilian populations en masse?    
18. Id.  
19. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Majority Opinion of Judge Eboe-
Osuji, ¶ 464 (Apr. 5, 2016). 
20. Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 17, at 14. 
21. See Jack Ewing, Former VW Engine Chief Arrested, Signaling 
Widening Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/business/volkswagen-diesel-
cheating.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9SW9-VVGH] (reporting the 
arrest of a high-ranking executive of Volkswagen). 
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Finally, the Prosecutor “may also decide to prosecute lower level-
perpetrators where their conduct has been particularly grave or 
notorious.”22 This could include employees at low levels who are 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes at such a high level of gravity or 
notoriety that they cannot, indeed must not, escape justice. In 
corporate operations, such individuals are well positioned to 
implement higher-level instructions or policies.   
It is generally corporations, either privately owned or state-
owned, that accomplish the types of actions that the Prosecutor 
identified in the policy paper as fair game for her Office’s 
investigation: “Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, 
or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of 
land.”23 So corporations that are targeted for investigation, and the 
framing of charges, will still focus on corporate officers or employees 
and not the juridical person that employs them.   
But consider how powerful this tool can become in the future. 
Allow me a moment of bluntness.  On territorial jurisdiction alone, 
multinational corporations are cooked. They operate in and across 
many jurisdictions, and one or more of those jurisdictions is likely to 
be a State Party to the Rome Statute, or a jurisdiction mandated by 
the U.N. Security Council to be investigated by the International 
Criminal Court, and where criminal conduct has occurred. On 
nationality jurisdiction, multinational corporations are cooked. They 
employ nationals of many countries and it is entirely possible that one 
of those nationals will be in a position of authority and action within 
the corporation in connection with the company’s engagement in 
atrocity crimes, even if the crimes are committed on the territory of a 
non-party State.   
On temporal jurisdiction, multinational corporations are cooked. 
There has been enough destruction of the environment, illegal 
exploitation of natural resources, and illegal dispossession of land 
since July 1, 2002, and even since any State Party joined the 
International Criminal Court with respect to its own territory, to fully 
occupy investigative inquiries, whether by referral or by initiation of 
the Prosecutor.    
Finally, on subject matter jurisdiction, multinational corporations 
are cooked. The Prosecutor’s list of environmental, natural resources, 
and land grab crimes by no means excludes her investigation of 
corporate complicity in more direct forms of ethnic cleansing and 
other crimes against humanity as well as war crimes. One might hope 
that the Holocaust was the last time we witnessed corporate 
complicity in genocide, but I fear otherwise. Dean Michael Kelly 
 
22. Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 17, at 14. 
23. Id. 
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addresses that issue masterfully in his recent book.24 For example, 
corporations have engaged extensively. Military contractors in 
particular, including the manufacturers of weapons, need to be 
particularly sensitive to this emerging field of liability.   
Of course, there remains the theoretical possibility of amending 
the Rome Treaty to explicitly extend its personal jurisdiction to 
juridical persons. State Parties could amend Articles 1 and 25(1) to 
include juridical persons.   
Covering the consequential meaning of including juridical persons 
would require extensive amendments to theRome Statute. Careful 
consideration would have to be made to distinguish, if necessary, 
between natural and juridical persons for purposes of production of 
evidence, the exercise of due process rights, proper physical presence 
of the defendant (who would appear for the corporation) in relevant 
proceedings, state cooperation requirements unique to corporations, 
and discerning which penalties are available and enforceable against 
corporations in the event of a guilty judgment.25   
Then there would be the staffing, at considerable cost, of a whole 
new division of the Office of the Prosecutor with lawyers and 
individuals of business and financial expertise who know how to 
investigate corporate conduct. Of course, such talent already is 
required as the Prosecutor turns her attention to corporate conduct 
leading to atrocity crimes. The election of at least some judges would 
need to turn in part on their expertise in criminal law as it pertains to 
corporate conduct. Any group of amendments covering juridical 
persons in the Rome Treaty would require approval by two-thirds of 
the State Parties pursuant to Article 121(3) and, if that hurdle is 
leaped, then such amendments would have to be ratified or accepted 
by seven-eighths of the State Parties in order to come into force 
pursuant to Article 121(4) of the Rome Treaty. 
There might be a different path, namely negotiation of a protocol 
to the Rome Statute that would permit State Parties that join it to 
“opt in” to coverage of juridical persons. However, such a protocol 
may be very difficult to negotiate as it would still have to transform 
the Rome Treaty radically to cover juridical persons only for those 
State Parties ratifying or accepting the protocol. The protocol would 
have to largely mirror the complex amendments required for a 
comprehensive overhaul of the Rome Treaty with straight 
 
24. See generally MICHAEL J. KELLY, PROSECUTING CORPORATIONS FOR 
GENOCIDE (2016)(debating a historical and legal liability for 
corporations who participate in human rights violations). 
25. See David Scheffer, Corporate Liability Under Rome Statute, HARV. 
INT’L L. J. (Jul. 7 2017), http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/07/ corporate-
liability-under-the-rome-statute/ [https://perma.cc/PE9L-QG79]. 
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amendments, and may still need to be initially adopted by two-thirds 
of the State Parties pursuant to Article 121(3).26 
Any empirical study of corporate conduct internationally would 
not conclude that the presumption of corporate impunity is dead, as 
any reading of the news alone informs us that far too much corporate 
misconduct continues unchallenged. Surely, however, the tide is 
turning towards challenging the presumption and the reality of 
corporate impunity, if not as a matter of criminal law, than as a 
matter of reporting requirements mandated by law or by international 
organizations or civil society or as a matter of moral decision-making 
at the highest levels of corporate management.   
Professor Kaeb and I co-chair the Working Group on Business 
and Human Rights of the U.N. Global Compact’s PRME initiative,27 
where we seek to broaden the curriculum of business schools in 
particular to ensure that students understand the importance of 
compliance with human rights standards as they enter the corporate 
management ranks. We struggle against the view that this is a subject 
falling outside business and management instruction, and yet in 
recent years there has been a healthy increase in curriculum offerings 
and activities that focus on the human rights agenda.  That gives me 
cause for hope, as would the Supreme Court’s affirmation of corporate 
civil liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the International 
Criminal Court’s tactful and challenging journey into corporate 
criminal liability through the decisions and actions of corporate 
officials. 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
26. Id.  
27. PRME Working Group on Business and Human Rights, PRME (2016), 
http://www.unprme.org/working-groups/display-working-
group.php?wgid=3306 [https://perma.cc/N83S-LPU8].   
